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Clarion University 
David O. Brink, in various writings, claims that moral theorists 
should be moral realists.1 However, his argument in favor of the 
acceptance of moral realism includes an argument to reject internalism, and 
Brink claims that all versions of internalism fail; moral theorists must 
accept both realism and externalism. If Brink is correct, no version of 
internalism can provide us with an adequate moral theory. Thus, any 
internalist must defend his or her theory from Brink's criticisms, and such a 
defense will be given in this paper. I will argue that Brink's claim that 
externalism, not internalism, " . . .is the appropriate way to represent the 
practical or action guiding character of morality"2 i s false. 
I. BRINK'S CHARACTERIZATION OF INTERNAL THEORIES 
Brink's rejection of internalism is supposed to be aimed at all versions 
of the view. Since this is the case, the fundamental problem with his 
rejection of internalist theories is that it fails to address the more 
plausible versions of internalism. Because of the way in which he 
characterizes internalism, Brink fails to include versions of internalism 
like those of W.D. Falk3 and Bernard Williams.4 Instead, Brink defines 
every internalist position as a position concerning the connection between 
motivation and moral concepts. He states that: 
. . .we can, for our purposes, formulate, internalism as the 
claim that the concept of a moral consideration itself 
(read: 'concept itself] necessarily motivates the agent to 
perform the moral action or necessarily provides the 
agent with reason to perform the moral action.5 
1 For the most complete discussion of his views, see David O. Brink, Moral 
Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
especially pp. 37-50. 
2 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. XXIV, Supplement (Spindel Conference 1986: Moral Realism), p. 37. 
3 For an account of Falk's version of internalism, see: W.D. Falk, "'Ought' 
and Motivation" in Readings in Ethical Theory, Wilfrid Sellars & John 
Hospers, eds. (NY: Appleton-Cenrury-Crofts, Inc., 1952), pp. 492-510. 
4 For an account of Williams' version of internalism, see: Bernard Williams, 
"Internal and external reasons" in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 101-113. 
5 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," p. 26. 
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By this, Brink means that all internalist theories are ones which: 
. . .claim that it is a part of the concept of a moral 
consideration that such considerations motivate the 
agent to perform the moral action or provide the agent 
with reason to perform the moral action.6 
This formulation of internalism originates with Frankena.7 Frankena 
considers all versions of internalism as theories concerning the analysis of 
moral terms, and Brink seems to be influenced by this view. 
However, Frankena's formulation of the internalist position fails to 
capture an important aspect of internalism. Internalism does not have to 
rely on a claim that the concept of a moral consideration necessarily 
motivates an agent. Since Brink accepts Frankena's characterization, 
Brink argues that all internalists rely on the claim that the 'concept itself 
necessarily motivates. Thus, when Brink characterizes all versions of 
internalism as conceptual claims about the connection between obligations 
and motives or reasons for action, he fails to address the internalist view in 
its most plausible form. 
This mistaken characterization of internalism is apparent in Brink's 
consideration of a principle taken from Harman's defense of relativism. 
The principle is stated as: 
1. To be under an obligation to do X, one must have reason 
todoXS 
Brink then uses this principle to define all versions of internalism. 
However, his definition relies on his characterization of internalism as a 
thesis about moral concepts. Brink states that: 
(1) is sometimes defended as a conceptual truth about 
morality. The proponents of (1) say that it is "simply 
part of the concept of morality," that to be under a moral 
obligation to do X is to have a reason to do X. This 
position is sometimes called internalism.9 
6 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 39. 
7 William K. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in recent Moral 
Philosophy" in Perspective on Morality, K.E. Goodpaster, ed. (Notre Dame 
Press, 1976), p. 41. 
8 Brink, "Moral Realism Defended," in Ethical Theory: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings, Louis P. Pojman, ed., (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
1989), p. 44. 
9 Ibid, p. 46. 
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Although Brink himself claims that "sometimes" those persons defending 
(1) as a conceptual truth about morality call this position "internalism," he 
criticizes, and rejects, all versions of internalism based on the above 
definition. Brink immediately generalizes from this version to all other 
versions of internalism, and he begins to call this position by the general 
name "internalism."10 
He stresses that a consequence of internalism (of any form) 1 1 is that: 
Since it is the concept of morality which shows that 
moral considerations necessarily motivate or provide 
reasons for action, this claim about the motivational 
power or rationality of morality must be a priori. Since it 
is the concept of morality itself which determines this 
fact, the rationality or motivational power of moral 
considerations cannot depend upon what the content of 
morality turns out to be, facts about agents, or a 
substantive theory of rationality.12 
Brink presents an inadequate characterization of all versions of 
internalism, since internalism, in its general, and most plausible, form (the 
form suggested by Falk and accepted by Williams), is a claim that, 
necessarily, if any agent has a moral obligation to do an action, x, at a time, 
t, that agent has a motive or reason (or both) to do x at t. This general 
internalist claim is closer to premise 1 of Brink's reconstruction of the 
"antirealist argument": 
1. To be under a moral obligation to do x, one must have a 
reason to do x. 1 3 
This is quite a different view from Brink's picture of internalism as a 
general thesis. Even if Brink is defining an internalist position, i.e., one 
way in which the necessary connection between motivation and obligation 
(or reasons for action) can be explained, he has not addressed all versions of 
internalism. In spite of this, Brink continually characterizes all versions of 
internalism as conceptual claims about morality. On Brink's 
characterization, the agent is either necessarily motivated, or necessarily 
provided with a reason for action, by moral considerations. 
1 0 Ibid, pp. 46-47. See also: David Brink, Moral Realism and the 
Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
39 & 278. 
1 1 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," p. 28. 
«Ibid. 
1 3 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 52. 
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II. TWO VERSIONS OF INTERNALEM 
Brink identifies two versions of internalism, strong and weak. His 
characterization of all internalist theories also affects this distinction, 
because both versions of internalism are identified as conceptual claims. 
He states that: 
Weak internalism claims that it is a conceptual truth 
about morality that moral requirements provide the 
agent with a reason for action, whereas strong 
internalism claims that it is a conceptual truth about 
morality that moral requirements provide the agent with 
conclusive, overriding, or sufficient reason for action.1 4 
While Brink fails to notice that internalism, as a general thesis, is not this 
kind of claim, he does recognize that an internalist may take one of two 
positions. The internalist accepts the view that having an internal motive 
(i.e., a motive either already in—Falk's version-or derivable from— 
Williams' version-the agent's set of motivations) or having an internal 
reason (i.e. a reason based on a motive either already in or derivable from 
the agent's set of motivations) is a necessary condition for obligation. 
However, the internalist position is divided concerning the role 
played by the motives or reasons for those actions we consider to be the 
moral ones. Focusing on internalism concerning motivation, some theorists, 
like Falk, claim that motives for moral actions are also sufficient reasons 
for action. Contrary to Brink's characterization, Falk does not think that 
moral motives are sufficient reasons in light of the 'concept itself.' Instead, 
Falk suggests that this status of moral motives is a result of: 
. . .some natural incentive to do any of these things, 
whether this incentive to be rooted in an innate 
disposition to be kind, or an acquired disposition to be 
law-abiding, or in the expectation of good for ourselves.15 
The priority of moral motives is not a result of a conceptual truth. Instead, 
moral motives are sufficient motives for action because they involve the 
most important human motivations. 
Other internalists reject this type of view. They claim that the 
motives for moral action, even though they provide a reason for action, are 
not sufficient. Williams holds this second version of internalism. He 
claims that whether the agent has a reason, or a sufficient reason, to act is 
1 4 Brink, "Moral Realism Defended," p. 47. 
1 5 W.D. Falk, "Morals Without Faith," Philosophy, v. 19 (1944), p. 15. 
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entirely dependent on the motives that agent has (the existing elements of 
S). Thus, not all internalists must accept the same claims about motives or 
reasons for action. 
III. A DEFENSE OF INTERNALISM 
Since characterizing internalism as simply a conceptual claim fails to 
address the main emphasis of both Falk's and Williams' theories, I will 
focus my defense of internalism on the versions of internalism which claim 
that, necessarily, having a moral obligation to perform an action at a time 
t, entails that the agent has a motive at t to perform that action, and rely 
on something other than the conceptual truths of morality to determine the 
role which moral motivations play in determining the agent's actions. On 
such views, whenever an agent has a moral obligation to perform an action, 
that agent also has a motivation for performing that action, i.e., an agent 
is never morally obligated to perform an action at t which the agent has no 
motive, at t, to perform. How this necessary connection gets spelled out 
varies from theory to theory. According to some internalist theories, the 
'concept itself may provide the necessary motivation the agent must have 
in order to perform the moral action. 
As Brink points out, these theories do not provide a strong case for 
internalism. Even though he fails to recognize that not all internalist 
theories make the claim that the 'concept itself necessarily motivates, 
Brink identifies some problems with the internal theories that depend on 
conceptual truths regarding morality. His point may be clarified by 
discussing the three types of internalist theses that Brink identifies. The 
first type of internalism is labeled "Agent internalism" and is 
characterized as follows: 
Agent internalism claims that it is in virtue of the 
concept of morality that moral obligations motivate, or 
provide reason for, the agent to do the moral thing. Thus, 
it is a conceptual truth about morality, according to agent 
internalism, that agents have reason or motive to comply 
with their moral obligations.16 
I will restrict my discussion of Agent internalism to those theories making 
claims about motivation. How are we to understand Agent internalism? 
The thesis, as stated, is ambiguous. There are at least three ways of 
interpreting the Agent internalist's view. First, such theorists might be 
claiming that the agent is morally obligated to do x and this obligation is 
followed by a motive to do x. Since Agent internalism has been defined as 
the view that the moral obligation provides the motive, one interpretation 
1 6 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," p. 27. 
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of "provides" is that the agent is obligated and this obligation then results 
in a motive for performing that action. Since this version of Agent 
internalism claims that the agent is obligated to do x, and this obligation 
results in a motive to do x, the obligation must apply to the agent no matter 
what motivations that agent presently possesses. 
Agent internalism, on this first interpretation of "provides," claims 
that the agent can have a moral obligation at a time, t, to perform an 
action x and that moral obligation motivates the agent at a time later than 
t to do x. Consequently, such an Agent internalist must accept the view that 
the moral obligation comes from, as Falk would say, "outside" the agent, 
i.e. the agent is not obligated to do x from within the agent's own set of 
motivations. Falk has claimed that a theory is an external theory if the 
moral obligation comes from a source outside, or external to, the agent. 
Agent internalism, in this first interpretation of "provides," seems to be 
such a theory. The moral obligation applies to the agent and, only then, 
the agent is motivated to act. This follows from the claim that the moral 
obligation to do x provides the motive for performing x. In other words, the 
agent is morally obligated to, e.g., feed the poor, and it is a conceptual 
truth that this obligation provides the agent with a motive to feed the 
poor. 
Notice, however, that this first interpretation includes the claim that 
the agent can have an obligation, at t, io do x without x having any 
connection to the agent's set of motivations. Thus, anyone holding the 
above type of theory is claiming that moral obligations are external to the 
agent, i.e., that these obligations apply to the agent regardless of any lack 
of connection with the agent's present motivations. If the obligation to feed 
the poor provides a motive to feed the poor, then, regardless of the agent's 
existing motivations, a motive for feeding the poor is provided by the 
moral requirement to feed the poor. Since the agent's obligation to feed the 
poor provides the agent with a motive to feed the poor, this first type of 
Agent internalist is claiming that moral obligations can be temporally 
prior to any motives for performing the obligatory action. Such a theory is 
not helped by claiming that once the agent is obligated, he or she will, in 
fact, be motivated to perform the moral action. Claiming the agent is 
provided with a motive once that agent is obligated does not result in an 
internalist theory. Internalism, in general, claims that moral obligations 
are not imposed from an outside, or external, source. Thus, this 
characterization of Agent internalism does not seem to be internalism at 
a l l . 
Perhaps we need another sense of "provides" to adequately capture 
Brink's characterization of Agent internalism. We can give a second 
interpretation of "provides" that does not claim the obligation is 
temporally prior to the motivation it provides for the agent. If, according 
to this sense of "provides," the Agent internalist is claiming that the moral 
obligation occurs simultaneously with the motivation, this may be some 
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version of internalism, but it is not intelligible. On this second version of 
Agent internalism each moral obligation has at least one motive attached 
to it. The agent is obligated to do x regardless of that agent's present 
motivations, and acquiring this obligation brings at least one motive with 
it. This is, indeed, mysterious. Some explanation of how these motives are 
attached to the obligations must be given, and such an explanation does not 
seem possible. One possible explanation of this simultaneous motivation is 
to claim that all agents have a desire to do what is moral. However, this 
seems false. As Robertson has pointed out, 1 7 attributing a universal desire 
which is frustrated in many, perhaps most, people (and these people are 
unaware of this desire and its frustration) is not a satisfactory explanation. 
Finally, Agent internalism may appeal to a claim concerning a third 
sense of "provides." This third interpretation results in a version of Agent 
internalism that may be found in Brink's discussion of his view that Agent 
internalism threatens morality. Brink explains this threat as follows: 
If agent internalism is true, it would seem that our views 
about people's moral obligations would have to be 
restricted or tailored to actions people already have a 
desire to perform.18 
Setting aside Brink's claim that all versions of internalism are conceptual 
claims, from this quote it seems as if "Agent internalism" is used by Brink to 
identify a position similar to the one that I have been calling 
"internalism." 
However, even with this third interpretation, there are further 
problems with Brink's characterization of Agent internalism. On this 
interpretation, Brink has restricted this type of internalism to the agent's 
desires. According to this mistaken view of internalism, the internal 
theory is a theory strictly concerned with an agent's existing desires, and 
the internalist thesis is one which implies that all agents are obligated to 
do only those actions which they want to perform. However, internalists 
do not have to claim: 
3. Hence, one can have an obligation to do X only if doing 
X would contribute to the satisfaction of one's desires. 1 9 
One of Williams' significant contributions to the discussion of 
internalism was to point out that, since an agent's motives change over 
time, an internalist is not restricted to the claim that an agent is morally 
1 7 John Robertson, "Internalism About Moral Reasons," Pacific 
Phüosophical Quarterly, vol. 67 (1986), p. 129. 
1 8 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 45. 
1 9 Brink, "Moral Realism Defended," p. 44. 
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obligated to do only those actions which she already has a motive rar 
performing. The internalist claim is that the agent cannot perform actions 
which she has no motive to perform. Consequently, the agent must have a 
motive at a time, t, in order to perform an action, x, at t. From this claim, it 
does not follow that an agent can perform only those actions which she is 
presently motivated to perform. As long as the agent can arrive at (by 
practical reasoning) a motive for performing x from the set of motives the 
agent has at a time prior to t (t-1), it is possible for the agent to arrive at a 
motive for performing x at t. 
Since the internalist accepts the principle that ought implies can, on 
the internalist view there can only be universal moral obligations, i.e. 
moral actions required of all individuals, if all humans have some motive 
or motives for performing those actions. The motive must either be already 
present in the agent's existing set of motives or be "closely associated" 2 0 
with the agent's current motives. If Brink intends to object to this 
consequence of internalism, then his objection is actually based on a 
consequence of all versions of internalism. Internalism does, in fact, tie an 
agent's obligations to her motivations. The internalist reply to an objection 
to this consequence of internalism is simply that, whether the externalist 
finds this consequence appealing or not, we cannot act without a motive 
and, since we cannot be morally required to perform those actions 
impossible for us to perform, we cannot be morally required to perform 
actions we have no motive for performing. The challenge for the 
externalist is to explain how we can be morally obligated to perform 
actions we cannot, possibly, perform. 
Additionally, the internalist does not have to base his or her theory 
entirely on what an agent desires. Although desire based theories are one 
version of internalism, the internalist claim would require a modification 
of 3 above. The general statement of an internalist theory would look like 
this: 
3'. Hence, one can have an obligation to do x at t only if 
one has some motive, at t, to do X. 
This change (from 3 to 3') is not a minor one. The internalist can recognize 
that desires are only one type of motivation. Desires to do x are a subset of 
motives to do x. Motives include desires but, as Williams points out, 2 1 
emotional reactions, loyalties, and various other mental properties of an 
agent are also motives to do x 2 2 As a result, an internalist may claim that 
2 0 Williams, "Internal and external reasons," p. 103. 
2 1 Ibid, p. 105. 
2 2 If "desire" is read broadly to cover all cognitively accessible 
inclinations, then I will agree that statement 3 can be used to characterize 
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an agent has a motive to do x even if that agent does not have a desire to do 
x. The internalist's general claim is that, necessarily, if an agent has a 
moral obligation to perform x at t, that agent has a motive, at t, to do x. 
Thus, Brink's objection to Agent internalism must be changed by substituting 
"motive" for "desire." When this change is made, Brink's objection is that, 
according to Agent internalism, each agent's moral obligations must be 
tailored to those actions she or he already has a motive to perform. This 
tailoring of obligations to the agent's motives is only correct if Brink 
realizes that an agent can be obligated not only to perform those actions 
which the agent presently has a motive for, but also those actions which 
the agent could be motivated to perform by reasoning from those present 
motives. Brink does not adequately reject this internalist claim. 
Thus, all three interpretations of Agent internalism fail. According to 
the first interpretation of Agent internalism, the obligation exists prior to 
the motive or reason. If the obligation exists prior to the motive, the moral 
obligation may lack any connection with the agent's existing motives, and 
Agent internalism fails for the same reason that Williams claims 
externalism fails. There is no motive for the agent to reason from to arrive 
at the motive to perform the moral action. According to the second 
interpretation, the motive is somehow attached to the motivation. If we 
accept this interpretation and present the Agent internalist as claiming 
that the obligation has some motive attached to it, this claim is not 
intelligible. Thus, the first two interpretations of Agent internalism result 
in a view that is either an externalist theory or unintelligible. 
The third interpretation is closest to the view Falk originally calls 
"internalism." However, Brink's characterization must be slightly 
adjusted in order to capture versions of internalism such as Falk's, 
Williams', and my own. Brink's third interpretation still identifies all 
versions of internalism as theories that rely on the concept of morality to 
motivate or provide reasons for action, and this is false. Additionally, 
since the internalist does not have to accept that the agent's obligations 
are tied to that agent's desires, capturing the most plausible internalist 
claim requires substituting "motives" for "desires." Without these 
adjustments, Brink's rejection of Agent internalism, as characterized, does 
not reflect on internalism in general; his argument docs not address the 
internalist claim as this claim is identified by Falk and Williams. 
Internalism, in its most plausible form, is the view that an agent cannot be 
obligated at a time, t, unless there is, at t, some connection between the 
obligatory action and the agent's existing motives, and this is the view 
that all moral theorists who believe ought implies can must accept. 
The second version of internalism Brink identifies is Appraiser 
internalism. Brink states: 
internalism. However, since many externalists do not read desire in this 
sense, the substitution of 3' for 3 may eliminate confusion. 
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Appraiser internalism claims that it is in virtue of the 
concept of morality that moral belief or moral judgement 
provides the appraiser with motivation or reason for 
action. Thus, it is a conceptual truth about morality, 
according to appraiser internalism, that someone who 
holds a moral belief or makes a moral judgment is 
motivated to, or has reason to, perform the action judged 
favorably. 2 3 
Acknowledging that Brink is mistaken in his characterization that 
Appraiser internalism is always a conceptual claim. Brink's comments 
concerning Appraiser internalism still merit some discussion. 
Again, I will restrict my discussion to those theories concerning 
motivation. According to Brink, this version of internalism is different 
from the first because Appraiser internalism: 
. . .ties the appraiser's motivation or reasons for action to 
the appraiser's beliefs or judgments, independently of 
whether these beliefs or judgments are correct or 
justifiable.24 
Thus, this version of internalism is not subject to an earlier criticism of one 
interpretation of Agent internalism. Appraiser internalism is not claiming 
that there is an external moral obligation and that obligation motivates 
the agent to act morally. This version of internalism is not a disguised 
externalist theory. 
Since Brink rejects this second version of internalism for the same 
reason that he rejects the third version, I will first explain this third 
version—the view Brink calls "Hybrid internalism." He characterizes this 
third version of internalism as follows: 
Hybrid Internalism claims that it is a conceptual truth 
about morality that the recognition of a moral obligation 
motivates or provides the agent (the person who 
recognizes his obligation) with reason for action. 2 5 
The problem Brink identifies for both Appraiser and Hybrid internalism is 
that on either of these two versions there cannot be anyone who is an 
amoralist, and Brink notes that the psychological facts are that some 
persons simply are amoralists. As Brink points out: 
2 3 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," p. 27. 
2 4 Ibid. 
2 5 Ibid, p. 27. 
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Though indifference to what are regarded as moral 
considerations may be fairly rare, it does seem to exist. 
Some people (e.g. certain sociopaths) do not care about 
moral considerations.26 
Since Brink believes that these versions of internalism cannot allow for the 
fact that amoralists, although rare, do exist, he claims that internalism 
must be rejected. 
If Brink is correct in claiming that these versions of internalism cannot 
allow for the existence of the amoralist, this would be a good reason to 
reject Appraiser and Hybrid internalism. However, Brink's claim that 
these versions of internalism cannot allow for the amoralist rests on his 
characterization of internalism as a view involving a conceptual truth 
about morality. Brink states: 
The (appraiser or hybrid) internalist about motives 
claims it is a conceptual truth about morality that moral 
judgment or belief motivates. According to the 
internalist, then, it must be conceptually impossible for 
someone to recognize a moral consideration or assert a 
moral judgment and remain unmoved. This fact raises a 
problem for internalism; internalism makes the amoralist 
conceptually impossible.27 
Since the more plausible versions of internalism do not have to involve 
conceptual claims, these internalists could claim that the agent can 
recognize a moral consideration or assert a moral judgment and fail to be 
moved. Perhaps such internalists might claim that the amoralist has 
other motivations that always override any moral ones. On this view, the 
amoralist's claim that he doesn't care at all about moral concerns is an 
expression that the stronger motivations control that agent's behavior. An 
internalist also has the option of relying on a claim similar to Hume's, and 
asserting that moral reasoning without sentiments cannot move. On such a 
version of internalism, the amoralist, although he can perform moral 
reasoning, lacks moral sentiments and, consequently, is not moved by moral 
considerations. Thus, there are at least two different ways in which 
internalism can explain the existence of the amoralist, and neither Hybrid 
nor Appraiser internalism must always deny his existence. 
Although I do not believe that Hybrid internalism is an adequate 
version of internalism or that Appraiser internalism is the best version of 
internalism, one can consistently maintain a version of these types of 
2 6 Ibid, p. 29. 
2 7 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 46. 
58 AUSLEGUNG 
theories with the fact that amoralists do exist. If an Appraiser or Hybrid 
internalist claimed that moral beliefs or the recognition of moral 
obligations provide a motive for action, but do not provide a sufficient 
motive for action, such a theorist could claim that the amoralist is a person 
who's moral motivations never override other motivations. Brink himself 
recognizes that the Appraiser or Hybrid internalist may respond in this 
manner, but he claims that such a response is inadequate.2 8 Brink claims 
that this response still does not acknowledge that the amoralist can be " . . 
.someone who is completely indifferent to what he recognizes to be morally 
required." 2 9 Rather than defend Appraiser or Hybrid internalism against 
Brink's amoralist challenge, I will argue that this challenge does not 
require the rejection of the more plausible versions of internalism (those 
most similar to the version Brink labels as Agent internalism). 
First, Brink does not claim this amoralist challenge (the amoralist's 
asking why he should care about moral demands) even applies to Agent 
internalism. Instead, Brink claims that: 
. . .agent internalism holds our moral theories hostage to 
agents' desires, and appraiser and hybrid internalism 
prevent us from recognizing the amoralist and, thus, from 
in this way taking the amoralist challenge seriously.3 0 
Thus, it seems as if Brink is claiming that the amoralist challenge is not 
taken seriously only by Appraiser or Hybrid internalism. Assuming that 
Brink may want to include Agent internalism in his objection, I will provide 
examples of a means of consistently maintaining internalism along with 
the view that there are amoralists whose questions concerning moral 
demands must be taken seriously. 
The internalist has several options. First, the internalist can claim 
that the amoralist is simply a person who has no motive, and consequently 
no moral obligation, for performing those actions which other people 
regard as morally obligatory. One explanation for this absence of 
obligation might be that the amoralist is someone who does not have the 
typical human motivations and, thus, does not have the typical concern for 
moral considerations. On such a view, moral obligations are not entirely 
universal; i.e., moral obligations would hold of almost all human beings 
(but not every human being) because the motives for performing those 
actions are present in most, but not all, humans. Thus, the internalist could 
say that the amoralist, who lacks the moral motives, cannot perform those 
actions usually considered obligatory and, consequently, is not morally 
obligated as others are. I am certain that Brink would find this reply 
2 8 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 48. 
»Ibid. 
3 0 Ibid, p. 49. 
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unsatisfactory, since this internalist would answer the amoralist challenge 
by agreeing with the amoralist that the amoralist's lack of concern for 
moral demands is well founded. 
However, an internalist may also maintain that the amoralist, 
although indifferent to moral considerations, does have a motive to 
perform certain moral actions. Such an internalist could claim that moral 
motives are not sufficient motives for action and the amoralist (who does 
have moral motives) simply does not recognize the motives for performing 
the morally obligatory action. The moral motive could be a dispositional 
one (i.e. a motive the agent has, but is presently unaware of), and the 
amoralist's lack of concern with morality could stem from a failure to 
recognize the moral motive which is a part of his own motivational set. In 
fact, Williams could argue that the agent has a motive and a moral 
obligation to perform these actions because those actions are the ones the 
agent* has an internal reason for performing. The agent's desires, aims, etc. 
are best served by performing that action, even though the agent may not 
realize it. This may be the case if moral motives are general human social 
motives. The agent may not realize that moral actions best promote his 
natural social desire and, consequently, fail to perform those actions. 
Williams might respond to the amoralist challenge by claiming that the 
amoralist has a motive and a reason for performing the moral actions. The 
agent is morally obligated to perform those actions because those actions 
are the ones which the agent has overriding reason(s) to perform. The 
amoralist is simply unaware of these motives or reason(s). The amoralist 
only claims a lack of interest in morality because he does not realize that 
these actions will best serve his existing desire, aims, etc. 
Internalists holding differing versions of internalism may find other 
ways of responding to the amoralist challenge. The point is that, once it is 
recognized that internalism is more than a claim concerning a conceptual 
truth about morality, the amoralist challenge can be taken seriously. 
Contrary to Brink's belief, an internalist can consistently hold internalism 
and acknowledge the existence of the amoralist. External theories are not 
the only theories which can account for the psychological fact that some 
people claim they lack an interest in moral considerations. 
Thus, all of the three versions of internalism, as identified by Brink, 
do fail. The fundamental problem with Brink's rejection of all internalist 
theories is that Brink's characterization of internalism about motives and 
internalism about reasons is too narrow. His general claim is that: 
Internalism about motives holds that the concept of 
morality itself shows that moral considerations 
necessarily motivate, while internalism about reasons 
claims that the concept of morality itself reveals that 
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moral considerations necessarily provide the agent with 
reason for action.31 
As previously stated, internalism is not a position that must depend on 
claims concerning "the concept of morality itself." In fact, it is precisely 
this oversight which allows Brink to conclude that only an externalist can 
claim that: 
. . .the motivational power or rationality of morality, 
whether necessary or contingent, a priori or a posteriori, 
depends upon things other than the concept of morality 
such as what the content of morality turns out to be, a 
substantive theory of reasons for action, or facts about 
agents such as their interests or desires.3 2 
Internalists can, and do, claim that the necessary connection between 
obligation and motivation does not depend on the concept of morality. This 
necessary connection can be a result of facts about general human 
motivations or reasons for action. Thus, the internalist does have the 
ability to base his or her theory on such things as the content of morality, a 
substantive theory of reasons for action, or facts about agents. Brink 
mistakenly places restrictions on all internalist theories that are not true 
of the version of internalism originally advocated by Falk and the later 
version adopted by Williams. 
IV. WHY ALL ADEQUATE MORAL THEORIES MUST BE INTERNAL 
The plausible internalist claim is that an agent cannot be obligated to 
perform an action which she or he has no motive to perform. On this view, 
there is a necessary connection between an agent's motivations and that 
agent's obligations. The agent necessarily is morally obligated to do an 
action, x, at a time, t, only if that agent has some motive at t to do x. 
Without some connection to the agent's motives, no action can be morally 
obligatory for that agent. We must accept an internalist view because any 
adequate theory of intentional actions will support internalism. 
This position is based on a feature of intentional actions—any 
intentional action, moral or otherwise, cannot occur if the agent has no 
motive to perform that action. Without an existing motive at a time, t, the 
action cannot occur because the agent has no impulse or tendency to act at t. 
The motive provides the impetus to do action x, and the agent can do x only 
if an impetus is present. Thus, an agent can only intentionally act when she 
has a motive for performing that action. There are no motive-less 
3 1 Brink, "Externalist Moral Realism," p. 28. 
»Ibid. 
THE ROLE OF INTERNALISM IN MORAL THEORY 61 
intentional actions. Since the principle that "ought implies can" is true, we 
must be able to perform an action in order to be morally obligated to perform 
that action. No one is morally obligated to perform actions which are not 
possible for her to perform. Adding to this principle the fact that all 
morally obligatory actions are intentional actions, we cannot be morally 
obligated to perform any action at a particular time, t, that we have no 
motive at t to perform. Simply stated, without a motive at t to perform 
action x, we cannot perform x at t; thus, we cannot be morally obligated to 
do x at t. 
In conclusion, agents do not act intentionally without a motive to 
perform that action. Since moral actions arc intentional actions, this fact 
about intentional actions combined with the principle that "ought implies 
can" provides evidence that all adequate moral theories must be internal. 
External theories are those which claim that the agent can be morally 
obligated to do x at t in spite of a lack of any motive to do x at t. Thus, the 
externalist claims that an agent does, or can, have moral obligations 
without a corresponding motive for performing that action. Externalists 
demand that the agent perform actions which it is not possible for the 
agent to perform. The importance of this fact for all moral theories is that 
morally obligatory actions cannot be actions which the agent has no motive 
to perform. All adequate moral theories must limit obligatory actions to 
those which are relative to the agent's motivations. Thus, all adequate 
moral theories must be some version of internalism. 
